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Abstract 
In street violence, bystanders are a potential resource for crime prevention, as they tend to 
be present when the police are absent. This paper describes evidence of bystanders taking 
an active role in the prevention of violence and considers implications for crime 
prevention initiatives. 
 
Introduction  
How do bystanders react when witnessing violence in public places? Most people may 
recall cases covered in the media where no one present intervened, and the scientific study 
of bystander behavior was prompted by one such tragic case: The 1964-rape and murder 
of the 28-year-old Kitty Genovese in New York, where 37 bystanders allegedly failed to 
intervene. Two social psychological scholars, Darley and Latané (1968), set out to explain 
the factors underpinning the bystander apathy observed in this and similar cases. In a 
series of influential experimental studies, they found that increasing numbers of 
bystanders present reduced the individual likelihood of intervention. This was described as 
the ‘bystander effect,’ and is typically attributed to the psychological process by which 
additional bystanders diffuse the individual responsibility for helping. That is, “why 
should I intervene when the others present could do it?” Decades of subsequent research 
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established the bystander effect as one of the best-replicated findings within social 
psychology (Manning, Levine, & Collins, 2007). 
Recently, however, this apathetic view of bystanders has been challenged. In a 
meta-analytical synthesis of the experimentally-based bystander effect research field, 
Fischer et al. (2011) showed that the bystander effect does not generalize to dangerous 
emergencies. When comparing bystander helping in low versus high danger conditions, 
they found that the bystander effect attenuated, or even reversed, in simulations of high-
danger. This suggests that bystanders intervene when it really matters, and that the 
presence of others does not diffuse the responsibility for helping. Rather, in dangerous 
situations, additional bystanders may offer a welcome support that increases the likelihood 
of helping. This latter ‘reversed bystander effect’ is meaningful from the standpoint of the 
intervener: “I can intervene because there are others to help me if this dangerous situation 
gets out of hand.”  
Fischer and colleagues have since verified the existence of the reversed 
bystander effect in field experiments simulating aggressive emergencies (Fischer & 
Greitemeyer, 2013). Adding to this, recent reassessments of the Kitty Genovese case 
document that several bystanders did in fact do something to help, as expected under the 
reversed bystander effect hypothesis (Manning et al., 2007). Taken together, this leaves 
us, both at the meta-analytical and anecdotal level of knowledge, with a more optimistic 
and agential view of bystanders.  
These recent findings not only reframe the role of bystanders within the 
psychological literature, but are also of importance for the parallel criminological work 
that conceptualizes bystanders as ‘guardians’ (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Here, it is argued 
that the mere presence of bystanders has a crime preventive effect, with bystander 
presence making it more difficult and risky from the perspective of the offender to commit 
a crime. Although this situational approach is effective in deterring ‘cold-headed’ crimes, 
(e.g., robberies, burglaries, petty theft), it may be less effective against ‘hot-headed’ 
crimes, such as street violent assaults (Hayward, 2007). Moving beyond a mere focus on 
bystander presence as a deterrent to crime, in this paper, we suggest that bystander actions 
may offer new avenues for behavior-based crime prevention initiatives.  
Alongside the meta-analytical work highlighting the importance of danger for 
bystander intervention, studies more recently examine bystander involvement in the 
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dangerous setting of real-life public violence. Here, the methods employed include 
assessments of police case file descriptions of public violent assaults (Heinskou & Liebst, 
2017), interviews with bystanders (Levine, Lowe, Best, & Heim, 2012), on-site 
observations of bystander involvement (Parks, Osgood, Felson, Wells, & Graham, 2013), 
and video observations of street violence using surveillance camera footage (Levine, 
Taylor, & Best, 2011; Liebst, Heinskou, & Ejbye-Ernst, 2018; Philpot, 2017). The latter 
video-based method, offers a unique possibility to systematically study how violent 
interactions unfold chronologically and how bystanders shape the ongoing situation 
(Lindegaard & Bernasco, 2018). 
  
How typical is intervention in street violence? 
The impression left by much of the existing bystander and guardianship literature is that 
those witnessing a real-life emergency rarely intervene to help (Manning et al., 2007). 
However, a recent systematic assessment of 500 police-reported public assaults in 
Copenhagen, Denmark, showed that at least one bystander intervened to help in 
approximately three-out-of-four cases (Heinskou & Liebst, 2017). The majority of these 
de-escalatory interventions were physical in nature and included behaviors such as holding 
back an aggressive individual or blocking conflict parties. This high intervention rate may 
be underestimated, however, given that police case files are not specifically interested in 
the behavior of bystanders and may exclude conflicts that did not escalate because of 
successful bystander intervention. Using a cross-national video sample of both reported, 
and, crucially, non-reported public assaults, Philpot and colleagues (2019) found that at 
least one bystander (but typically three or four) carried out helping interventions in nine-
out-of-ten of the aggressive incidents. Further, this study found similar rates of de-
escalation across three national contexts (the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and South 
Africa). Taken together, and in contrast to established ideas, these studies evidence that 
the rate of real-life intervention in public assaults is very high.  
 
How do people intervene? 
Within the traditional bystander literature field, there exists a binary understanding of 
bystander action—as passive or actively helpful. However, by studying the actual 
behaviors of bystanders, this dichotomous distinction is superseded by a multidimensional 
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understanding of bystander roles and action types. For example, de-escalatory helping 
may be expressed in a variety of forms: one can intervene in a physical manner by 
separating or blocking the conflict parties; in a non-physical way with pacifying gesturing 
or verbal pleas to calm down; or be directed towards third-parties, such as calling the 
police or asking a friend or bouncer to help (Heinskou & Liebst, 2017; Levine et al., 
2011).  
In addition to the de-escalatory helping measured in the above studies, 
bystanders may also intervene in escalatory manners. Bystanders may fight on behalf of 
their group, or even, paradoxically, use aggression with the purpose to de-escalate the 
conflict (Levine et al., 2012; Levine et al., 2011; Parks et al., 2013). Besides intervention 
into ongoing conflicts, video observational studies document that bystanders provide 
emotional care and stress-reducing touching to victims of violence post-conflict (Liebst, 
Philpot, Ejbye-Ernst, Bernasco, et al., 2018; Lindegaard et al., 2017). Bystander helping, 
both in the ongoing conflict and post-conflict, are typically coordinated in a collective 
effort between multiple bystanders (Bloch, Liebst, Poder, Christensen, & Heinskou, 2018; 
Levine et al., 2011). For example, Bloch and colleagues describe post-conflict care as a 
coordinated task performed by a ‘caring collective,’ in which different bystanders take on 
different roles—e.g., one individual fetches paper towels in a nearby shop, while another 
comforts the victim. Note, that similar bystander coordination is also observed in non-
violent medical emergencies (Linderoth et al., 2015). 
 
Why do people intervene? 
To date, the most common explanation for bystander non-intervention is the increased 
number of those present—i.e., the bystander effect. However, as aforementioned, the 
bystander effect may not generalize to dangerous emergencies, in which additional 
bystanders may promote intervention—i.e., the reversed bystander effect (Fischer et al., 
2011). This latter finding is in line with a number of video observational studies recording 
higher levels of intervention in more populated emergencies (Levine et al., 2011; 
Lindegaard et al., 2017; Philpot, 2017). A Danish video-based study of violent public 
assaults, however, found that the individual propensity to intervene decreased with 
additional bystander presence, similar to the prediction of the classical bystander effect 
(Liebst, Philpot, et al., 2018; see also Phillips & Cooney, 2005). Taken together, the 
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evidence remains mixed when assessing the role of bystander numbers in real-life 
intervention contexts. Conversely, the high intervention rate consistently found in real-life 
violent settings indicates that danger is an important contextual predictor of intervention. 
However, a systematic comparison of real-life bystander intervention in non-dangerous 
versus dangerous/violent contexts is needed to ascertain the validity and strength of this 
association.  
A uniformly robust finding is that social group membership with a conflict 
party strongly predicts bystander intervention. Specifically, if the bystander identifies as 
being a member of the same social group as the victim or perpetrator, it is more likely that 
the bystander provides help (for a review, Levine & Manning, 2013). For example, Levine 
and colleagues (2012) found that bystanders are motivated to help victims whom they 
personally know—sometimes by fighting on their behalf, but most typically, through the 
de-escalatory ‘self-policing’ of their unruly friends. Extending this research, Liebst and 
colleagues examined the strength of social group membership as a predictor of bystander 
intervention in ongoing conflicts (Liebst, Philpot, Ejbye-Ernst, Dausel, et al., 2018). The 
researchers used video observational data from public assaults in Copenhagen, and 
examined whether the number of individuals present or social group membership best-
predicted bystander involvement. Social group membership was determined using 
nonverbal behavioral cues, such as collective behavior-in-concert and bodily proximity 
(Afifi & Johnson, 2005), which were then validated against police case file descriptions. 
Results showed that group membership outcompeted bystander presence as the main 
predictor of intervention. A similar result was recorded when assessing consolatory 
helping in the aftermath of the street assaults, with social group membership again the 
dominant predictor (Liebst, Philpot, Ejbye-Ernst, Bernasco, et al., 2018). Moreover, this 
finding is consistent with Lindegaard and colleagues’ (2017) previous study, which found 
that in the aftermath of commercial robberies, employees were, compared to members of 
the public, disproportionately more likely to console fellow victimized employees. 
While social group membership is now established as a key predictor of 
bystander intervention, Liebst et al. (2018) also associate this factor to an elevated risk of 
bystander victimization when intervening to help. In this study, which also relied on 
police-reported video data of Copenhagen assaults, the overall risk of victimization was 
quite low (at 12% for de-escalatory interveners, and 18% for de-escalatory/escalatory 
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mixed interveners). Further, these victimizations were typically low in severity—for 
example, being pushed away once by the perpetrator. The authors examined two potential 
risk factors of bystander victimization: whether it is more dangerous to intervene into 
severe conflicts, or whether it is more dangerous to intervene when knowing a conflict 
party. Results found no association between conflict severity and bystander victimization, 
but did identify social group membership as an elevated risk factor. Theoretically, this 
suggests that an intervening friend is not perceived as a neutral party by perpetrators, but 
as a partisan who is an eligible target of aggression. 
 
How helpful are interventions?  
Perhaps the most pertinent question is whether the bystander interventions are helpful in 
de-escalating conflicts—yet, surprisingly, little systematic evidence has addressed this 
question. This omission is, in part, due to the circumstance that the literature until recently 
has assumed bystanders are largely passive. Further adding to this issue, it remains 
statistically difficult to establish casual dynamics from observational data. However, in 
our view, based on over 500 qualitative observations of real-life captured assaults, 
bystanders play a key role in successfully ceasing conflicts. This aligns with the few 
studies examining the outcome of bystander actions. In a sequential video analysis of 
street violence in the United Kingdom, Levine, Best and Taylor (2011) indicated that 
cumulative interventions of multiple bystanders are associated with reduced conflict 
severity. This finding suggests, in line with Bloch et al. (2018), that cooperation between 
bystanders makes intervention successful. More recently, Philpot (2017) examined the 
distinction between bystander interventions aimed at one conflict party (i.e., the victim or 
the perpetrator) or aimed at both conflict parties. He found that de-escalatory interventions 
targeted at both conflict parties were associated with a lower overall severity than those 
aimed at sole individuals. This study, however, was not able to untangle the causal 
dynamics and should be interpreted with caution. Future research should prioritize 
systematic statistical studies of the helpfulness of bystander intervention.  
 
Discussion and implications 
Current advice from the Danish Crime Prevention Council (2002) highlights that 
bystanders witnessing street violence may easily escalate the situation or become a victim 
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themselves by intervening. Thus, it is suggested that bystanders stay at a distance from the 
conflict while making their presence known as to indirectly deter the offender. These 
recommendations fall in line with the criminological notion of bystanders as guardians 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979), in which it is the mere presence of bystanders that has a crime 
preventive effect. The recent evidence presented, however, advocates an update of this 
advice. Real-life data shows that bystanders are not passive or merely observant during 
street violence. Rather in the vast majority of conflicts at least one, but typically several 
bystanders, are physically intervening to help. Given this high intervention rate, it is 
important to provide guidance on how to intervene effectively and safely. Further, there is 
no empirical basis for the view that bystander intervention leads to escalation. To the 
contrary, evidence suggests that direct physical intervention is successful in de-escalating 
conflict. Further, the risk of bystander victimization and the severity of victimization are 
both fairly low, in particular for intervening strangers.  
The recent advances in bystander research may also inform urban and police 
crime prevention strategies. Within urban planning theory, there remains a debate whether 
large amounts of individuals on the street are detrimental or beneficial to public safety. On 
the one hand, some scholars suggest that more populated streets offer a greater possibility 
for interpersonal friction and conflict (see Townsley & Grimshaw, 2013), without anyone 
feeling obliged to taking responsibility for the place (Newman, 1972). This leads to 
recommendations that large groups should be split up by authorities and that street layouts 
should be designed to minimize pedestrian co-presence and traffic. On the other hand, 
some argue that the co-presence of individuals provides ‘safety in numbers,’ because there 
are more people present to intervene if necessary (Hillier, 2004). The literature assessed 
would suggest an important balance between the two arguments: While there is little doubt 
that the number of people present is a background condition for the emergence of violent 
hotspots, this increased presence also provides more bystanders who will actively 
intervene to help in cases of violence. Future research should look beyond the positive 
association between co-presence and violence and examine the counter-balance 
association of increased bystander co-presence and more helping.  
The finding that typically multiple bystanders coordinate to de-escalate 
conflicts has important implications for how police forces manage groups in public 
settings—for example, in nightlife drinking areas, where groups tend to be approached as 
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instigating rather than regulating violence (Levine et al., 2012). The present evidence 
shows that members of the public are effectively able to ‘self-police’ conflicts, without the 
necessary involvement of police authorities. This readily available bystander resource is 
not only cost-efficient, but may in certain situations be preferred (e.g., those events 
characterized by tensions between the police and the public) (Eck, 2015). The important 
point, however, is that official policing and informal self-policing are not mutually 
exclusive efforts. Bystanders have an established role as witnesses in legal proceedings of 
street violence. In our view, besides this role, bystanders should be further recognized as 
helpful actors in the conflict itself, where they can provide valuable assistance before the 
arrival of the police.  
With the success of bystander intervention programs addressing sexual 
violence on campuses (Jouriles, Krauss, Vu, Banyard, & McDonald, 2018), it is further 
recommended that crime prevention agencies engage members of the public more directly 
in bystander efforts targeting street violence. Such initiatives should inform the public that 
bystander intervention is commonplace, that it is likely to help, without exposing the 
intervener to great risk. Knowing that social group members are already highly likely to 
intervene, such initiatives should aim towards engaging even more strangers. This 
increased engagement is welcome from the perspective of the victim, but is also preferable 
given that strangers are exposed to the lowest risk of bystander victimization. Finally, such 
campaign may also alleviate the widespread fear that public strangers are a source of 
potential danger or are apathetic when witnessing violent crimes (Hale, 1996).  
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